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Preface 
The primary goal of the ILO is to work with member States towards achieving full and 
productive employment and decent work for all. This goal is elaborated in the ILO 
Declaration 2008 on Social Justice for a Fair Globalization,
1
 which has been widely 
adopted by the international community. Comprehensive and integrated perspectives to 
achieve this goal are embedded in the Employment Policy Convention of 1964 (No. 122), 
the Global Employment Agenda (2003) and – in response to the 2008 global economic 
crisis – the Global Jobs Pact (2009) and the conclusions of the Recurrent Discussion 
Reports on Employment (2010 and 2014). 
The Employment Policy Department (EMPLOYMENT) is engaged in global 
advocacy and in supporting member States in placing more and better jobs at the center of 
economic and social policies and growth and development strategies. Policy research and 
knowledge generation and dissemination are essential components of the Employment 
Policy Department’s activities. The resulting publications include books, country policy 
reviews, policy and research briefs, and working papers.
 2
 
The Employment Policy Working Paper series is designed to disseminate the main 
findings of research on a broad range of topics undertaken by the branches of the 
Department. The working papers are intended to encourage the exchange of ideas and to 
stimulate debate. The views expressed within them are the responsibility of the authors and 
do not necessarily represent those of the ILO. 
 
 
Azita Berar Awad 
Director 
Employment Policy Department 
1 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/dgo/download/dg_announce_en.pdf 
2 See http://www.ilo.org/employment. 
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Foreword 
This paper highlights how European Monetary Union (EMU) governance, as designed 
by the Maastricht Treaty and subsequent modifications, is unfit to deliver sound and 
effective macroeconomic management that is conducive to sustained and sustainable 
economic prosperity for all Europeans. This is especially evident at times of crisis. The 
paper argues that monetary and fiscal policy in the EMU design leave very little room for 
manoeuvre. This is consistent with the prescriptions of a prevailing consensus that focus 
mainly on the supply side of the economy and blames the crisis on the fiscal profligacy of 
the peripheral member states of the EMU. This has engendered pro-cyclical fiscal policies. 
The paper also argues that the inertial or pro-cyclical behaviour of fiscal authorities 
projected a reluctant European Central bank (ECB) to eventually take decisive (and 
controversial) ECB action. Without such action, however belated, the Eurozone would 
probably not exist today. 
The paper then points out that the ECB and European policy makers at large still 
adhere to the prevailing consensus. The consequence is that the policy response to the crisis 
is always too little and too late. The paper concludes that without reform of the Eurozone’s 
macroeconomic governance, it is difficult to foresee a permanent resolution of current 
woes. It suggests adopting a modified ‘golden rule’ of public finances – which gives 
primacy to protecting growth promoting investment during fiscal adjustments -  and 
considering the introduction of a dual (or even triple) mandate for the ECB. 
 
 
 Iyanatul Islam 
Chief 
Employment and Labour Market Policies Branch 
Employment Policy Department 
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Abstract 
This paper assesses the performance of the European Central Bank (ECB) during the 
crisis that started in 2008. The ECB statute is consistent with a view of the economy that 
was predominant in the 1990s, a view that postulates a very limited role for discretional 
policies in managing the business cycle. The ECB had therefore to stretch its mandate on 
several occasions during the crisis to avoid severe outcomes. It was unable to avoid a slow 
but inexorable slide of the Eurozone towards deflation and a liquidity trap. To restore 
robust growth, fiscal policy should be used, and institutions should be redesigned away 
from the Washington Consensus framework that shaped the Maastricht Treaty. Better rules 
for fiscal governance and a widening of the ECB mandate are proposed. 
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1. Introduction 
The global financial crisis that began in 2008 seems to be slowly fading away, as the 
world economy continues to recover from the worst shock since the 1930s. Recovery is 
fragile and uneven, as was aptly recalled by the latest IMF World Economic Outlook (IMF, 
2014). In particular, emerging economies (with the possible exception of China) may face 
difficult times ahead because their potential growth has been impacted by the crisis (and 
also by increased geopolitical risks). Yet, even if revised downwards, the IMF global 
growth forecast for the years ahead is acceptable. 
The first phase of the crisis has been extensively discussed. Suffice it  here to recall 
the salient facts: the unravelling of a small speculative sector of the US credit sector, the 
market for subprime loans, generated a cascading effect on the rest of the global financial 
system. Contagion was mostly due to the deregulation which allowed the proliferation of 
increasingly opaque financial instruments, spreading toxic assets in the portfolios of often 
unaware owners, and leading at the same time to excessive risk-taking and debt. When the 
US housing bubble burst, financial institutions worldwide, and also households and firms, 
rushed to sell their assets. This deleveraging process led to a credit crunch and to a drastic 
reduction in investment and consumption. The financial crisis therefore spilled over into the 
real economy. 
The policy response followed the typical textbook recipes that have been known since 
Keynes wrote the General Theory in 1936: the prompt intervention of central banks 
through massive credit to financial institutions prevented the meltdown of the financial 
sector. This injection, nevertheless, was ineffective in restarting the economy. In the 
process of deleveraging, banks, businesses and households shrank their balance sheets, thus 
reducing liquidity (see Adrian and Shin, 2010) at a faster pace than credit was increased by 
central banks. It did not,  therefore, translate into demand for goods and services. This 
liquidity trap, familiar to historians, made monetary policy lose traction, as was clear by the 
end of 2008. In line with Keynes' prescriptions, fiscal policy then took the centre stage; in 
the Spring of 2009, most advanced and emerging economies implemented massive stimulus 
plans to support demand and put the economy on a recovery path, even if at the price of a 
generalized deterioration of public finances. 
The European economy, in particular the Eurozone countries, began to diverge from 
the other advanced economies when, in the fall of 2009, Greece disclosed frauds in the 
management of public finances that had been going on for the previous decade. The Greek 
crisis revealed imbalances that went well beyond irresponsibility in the management of the 
public finances at the Eurozone periphery (Saraceno, 2013a).   Since then, while the rest of 
the world economy is heading towards a recovery, fragile certainly, but irreversible, the 
Eurozone has been mired in a deepening crisis, which may still endanger the very existence 
of the single currency. 
The scope of this paper is to assess the response to the crisis, looking both at the 
policies followed, and at the rules and institutions that European Monetary Union (EMU) 
has in place to ensure its good governance. The focus will be on monetary policy that, most 
probably against the will of ECB presidents Trichet and Draghi, came to be at the forefront 
of the fight against the crisis. In a nutshell, it argues that the ECB has been the only 
institution fighting against the breakup of the Eurozone, but mostly for the wrong reasons, 
i.e. the inertia and wrongheaded fiscal policy of Member States. It then argues that this 
dysfunctional behaviour of European policy makers is the fruit of a European version of the 
Washington Consensus, that has shaped institutions and, even more importantly, the mind-
set of those policy makers. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 is devoted to an analysis of the 
Eurozone’s slow slide into deflation during 2014. The following section builds on previous 
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work (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013) to describe the theoretical underpinnings of the so-
called Berlin-Brussels-Frankfurt (BBF) consensus. Section 4 then addresses the behaviour 
of the ECB during the crisis, showing how it went as far as the treaties allowed, and 
sometimes beyond, to fight speculation and the threat of exit by peripheral countries. 
Section 5 deals with what needs to be done to lift the EMU economy out of the crisis. The 
paper argues that in a liquidity trap there is only so much a central bank can do, and that the 
answer lies in a more active fiscal policy; this in turn would require modifying the current 
fiscal framework. The section concludes by asking whether a dual mandate, or even a triple 
mandate including fiscal stability, would better equip the ECB to fight recessions and foster 
economic growth.  
2. 2014 – Annus Horribilis 
The Summer of 2013 was a period of widespread optimism among European policy 
makers. Speculation was defused, European peripheral countries were no longer  in danger 
of leaving the euro, and their economies seemed to be going better. Partisans of austerity 
(see, for example, German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, 2013) claimed vindication 
of their view that  austerity and structural reforms, however painful in the short run, were 
necessary to improve the fundamentals of troubled economies, so as to take advantage of 
the recovery later on. The short-term pain of austerity and recession was justified as the 
price to pay to obtain the long-term gain of improved competitiveness and exports, together 
with convergence towards the benchmark represented by virtuous and successful countries 
like Germany. It was already clear at the time that this representation did not correspond to 
reality; first, because the Eurozone kept diverging (Saraceno, 2013b); and, second, because 
growth was driven mostly by export growth, and was therefore intrinsically fragile. There 
are two reasons why an export-led model is fragile: The first is the well-known fallacy of 
composition: not everybody can export at the same time, which means that by definition the 
German model cannot be generalized, and its success rests on other countries absorbing its 
excess savings. The second reason, more political, is that by betting on an export-led 
growth model, Germany and Europe will be forced to rely on somebody else’s growth to 
ensure their prosperity. This is of course a source of economic fragility, but also of 
irrelevance in the political arena, where influence goes hand in hand with economic power. 
Embracing the German economic model, Europe would condemn itself to a secondary role 
in the world arena.  
2014, Annus Horribilis of the Eurozone, has confirmed that there was no reason to be 
optimistic. Data from the European Commission (Figure 1) show that real GDP for the 
Eurozone will still be below its pre-crisis level in 2014, and is forecast to return above it 
only in 2016. In the meantime the United States is well above its pre-crisis peak (+8%). 
Even the more successful EMU economies like Germany are barely above the level of 2008 
(+3%), and their growth in the next two years is forecast to be rather disappointing. Two 
large economies, Italy and Spain, are around 8% below the peak. 
The persistent weakness of the Eurozone economy has slowly pushed the area towards 
deflation (Figure 2). At the beginning of 2013, the Eurozone inflation rate was around the 
target level of 2%. Since then, however, it has decreased almost continuously. The flash 
estimates for December 2014 officially mark, with a rate of -0.2%, the entry of the EMU 
into deflation. Considering in addition the turmoil caused by the recent change of 
government in Greece, there is little doubt that the Eurozone remains today the sick man of 
the world economy. The possibility of a triple dip, a third recession in 2015, cannot be 
ruled out, but even without that, the Eurozone is entering its eighth year of negative or 
stagnant growth; unemployment is at record high levels, and is not forecast to decrease for 
two more years at least (Figure3). The risk of a lost decade is becoming a reality. This calls 
for a comparison with the Japanese experience of the 1990s. Figure  shows real GDP 
evolution in Japan and in the EMU starting from 1992 (red line) and 2008 (blue line) 
respectively.  28 quarters into the crisis, Japan's GDP was 8 points larger than EMU's GDP 
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today. As it could be objected that this is unfair to the EMU because Japan in the 1990s 
never did experience a slump comparable to the one of 2008 in Europe, the yellow line 
plots Eurozone GDP starting from early 2009. Even taking into account the rebound, the 
Eurozone today does not match the performance of Japan in the 1990s. The conclusion, as 
Paul Krugman (2014) aptly puts it, is that the Eurozone  should stop looking at Japan as a 
worst case scenario, but rather as a role model
1
. 
Today the ECB is facing a situation that was not believed possible when its 
governance was designed with the Maastricht Treaty. The Treaty was designed to prevent 
free riding by Member States, and excessive inflation. Long periods of depressed growth 
were not believed to be possible any more in Europe or in the United States. This led to a 
design, grounded in a particular doctrine, which is today showing all of its limitations. 
3. The ECB mandate and the Berlin-Brussels Consensus 
The institutions for European economic governance were designed under the 
Maastricht Treaty, signed by the EU Member States in 1992. The Treaty contained the five 
criteria to be fulfilled by countries wishing to adopt the euro
2
, and the statute of the ECB. 
As Member States in the Eurozone remain in charge of their fiscal policy, the other major 
building block of European economic governance is the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The SGP organizes fiscal surveillance of 
countries belonging to the single currency around a preventive arm (broadly speaking a 
system of peer pressure, see Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2008), and a system of sanctions for 
countries not respecting the fiscal rule of a balanced budget over the business cycle. 
It is well known that the Maastricht Treaty also assigns to the ECB a strict inflation 
mandate: "The primary objective of the ESCB (Eurosystem) shall be to maintain price 
stability" (art. 127), and “Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall 
support the general economic policies in the Community” (art. 2). It is worth noticing that 
the ECB is given considerable independence by the Treaty in the definition of price 
stability that the ECB’s Governing Council defines as a "year-on-year increase in the 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of below, but close to 2%". 
In the United States, instead, the Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Act) amended the Federal Reserve Act in establishing a dual objective 
for monetary policy of price stability and full employment. These different institutional 
arrangements are no accident, but reflect the intellectual environment in which they 
emerged. The Humphrey Hawkins Act dates from a period in which Keynesian dominance 
in academic and policy circles posited a role for macroeconomic policy. As a consequence, 
monetary policy could, and should, include full employment among its objectives.  The 
Maastricht Treaty, on the other hand, centred European economic governance on the 
rejection of active macroeconomic policies: the ECB only has a mandate for price stability, 
and has considerable autonomy in pursuing it. Furthermore, the SGP forces countries to 
rely solely on automatic stabilizers to cushion economic fluctuations. This “Berlin-
Brussels-Frankfurt  Consensus”
 
(Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2013) is an evolution from the 
_______________________ 
 
1 Wolfgang Munchau (2014) argued recently that the length of the crisis, and the incapacity of European policy 
makers to endow the Eurozone with well-functioning governance endanger the  single currency more today than 
at the height of the crisis. 
2 The five criteria, aimed at guaranteeing nominal convergence before the adoption of the single currency, are: 
(1) Inflation close to the average between the lowest inflation rates in the zone; (2) long-term interest rates close 
to the average between the lowest interest rates in the zone; (3) two years at least in the exchange rate 
mechanism, without realignments; (4)  public deficit lower than 3% of GDP; (5) public debt lower than 60% of 
GDP, or approaching that level at a sufficiently fast pace. By the decision date of June 1998, 11 countries 
fulfilled the criteria, with Greece joining shortly afterwards. As of January 2015, the Eurozone has 19 members. 
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original Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990), a fuzzy concept used here to label any 
set of policies that follow three basic principles: first, the quest for macroeconomic stability 
(balanced budgets, price stability, and, for developing countries, exchange rate stability); 
second, supply-side structural reforms aimed at increasing competition and openness; and 
third, ignoring any possible trade-off between present and future growth. The Washington 
Consensus inspired development policies for more than two decades with mixed results 
(Gore, 2000; Rodrik, 2006). Furthermore, Fitoussi and Saraceno (2013) argue that today it 
is shaping policies and institutions in Europe. As a side note, it is interesting to notice how 
the proponents of the consensus have evolved. In the early 2000s Fitoussi and Saraceno 
talked about a "Brussels-Frankfurt-Washington" consensus, that later evolved into a 
"Berlin-Washington" consensus. In the current paper, the expression "Berlin-Brussels-
Frankfurt" (BBF) consensus was chosen, as the IMF has lately been distancing itself from 
the Consensus policy prescriptions (IEO, 2014). The discussion below shows that there 
may be grounds for believing that the ECB itself, showing unprecedented activism in 
managing the crisis, is also distancing itself from the Consensus. As this paper argues, 
however, this activism can be explained by the paralysis of other institutions (the 
Commission and Member States), and not by a change of paradigm in the Governing 
Council analyses. "Frankfurt" is therefore retained in the Consensus label. 
While its proponents change, the Consensus per se is rather stable, having its 
theoretical foundations in the neoclassical Walrasian theory. In a nutshell, the theory 
postulates the centrality of markets populated by rational agents who, if left free to operate 
without distortions, tend to converge spontaneously to "optimal" equilibria, characterized 
by full employment of resources and the maximization of a representative agent’s welfare 
(the so-called Pareto efficiency). Price and wage flexibility, then, ensures that demand 
adapts to full employment supply (a principle known as Say’s Law). The emphasis of the 
theory is then on supply-side measures capable of increasing the capacity of the economy to 
produce. Barring exceptional circumstances, this view considers aggregate demand 
management useless, if not actually harmful. Credible reforms would boost profits and 
productivity expectations, thus leading to increased demand and growth. And even if 
supply-side policies, reducing wages and social protection, were to have a negative impact 
on private demand, this would be more than offset by the export-led growth induced by 
gains in competitiveness.  
A crucial corollary of the Walrasian framework is that money, whose intrinsic utility 
is zero, is only demanded for transaction purposes. It stems from this corollary that, at least 
in the long run, money is neutral, i.e. it has no impact on the real sector, and only affects 
prices and inflation. In the short run, the existence of rigidities may suggest that monetary 
policy has real effects, as is for example the case for New-Keynesian models (see, for 
example, Woodford, 2003). However, long-run neutrality dictates that even in these cases, 
the best central banks can do is to keep strict inflation targets, thus anchoring private sector 
expectations and minimizing deviations from the optimal path of the economy. Rules, be 
they fiscal or monetary, are justified by the same token: they avoid policy-induced 
uncertainty, minimize the risk of biases in government action, and provide a stable 
environment for investment and growth. 
The existence of a Pareto superior equilibrium to which the market economy 
spontaneously tends once the appropriate conditions are met has very strong policy 
implications: the only role for economic policy is to make sure that barriers to free 
competition (monopolies, asymmetric information, rigidities) are removed through 
“structural reforms”, so that markets are able to converge to the optimal equilibrium path. 
Policy is not supposed to make choices, but only to clear the ground of obstacles to the free 
unfolding of market forces, leading to a state that, by definition, represents the best of all 
possible worlds. This is why, for the Consensus, technocrats are actually preferable to 
politicians; not only because they are supposedly more competent, but also and especially 
because they are free from the vested interests and political bias that could lead to 
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distortions in market incentives. In addition, they are less bound than politicians by the 
“fetters and constraints” of democracy. 
The BBF Consensus, embedded in European institutions and practices since the early 
1990s, led European governments to give up active management of the business cycle, and 
to engage in a non-cooperative strategy through fiscal and social competition. Even before 
the global financial crisis hit the world economy, the inertia of European policy makers in 
comparison with their homologues across the ocean was striking. Compare the indicators of 
monetary and fiscal policy activism. Table 1, updated from Fitoussi and Saraceno (2011), 
shows that in the pre-crisis period short-term rates in the US and in the Eurozone have been 
on average very similar (only 40 basis points of difference). This is not informative per se, 
because the interest rate level has to be determined in regard to inflation and output gap 
objectives, which may have been different in the two zones. What is in fact striking is the 
much higher variability of interest rates in the United States, with the standard deviation 
double that of the EMU, and a spread between the maximum and the minimum value which 
is also significantly larger. 
Table 1: Short-term interest rates descriptive statistics: 1999-2007 
 Fed Funds ECB Repo  
Mean 3.53 3.09  
s.d. 1.82 0.90  
Max 6.5 4.75  
Min 1 2  
Source: Datastream  
The same conclusions hold if we look at a similar table for fiscal policy. Table 2 
reports the descriptive statistics of the fiscal impulse
3
 for the largest European economies, 
the UK, US and Japan. 
Table 2: Fiscal impulse descriptive statistics: 1999-2007 
 GER ITA ESP FRA EMU4* UK USA JAP 
Mean -0.15 0.04 -0.30 0.23 -0.03 0.51 0.44 -0.73 
s.d. 1.80 1.20 0.65 0.58 0.90 2.69 1.28 1.86 
Max 4.39 2.72 1.03 1.23 2.27 5.25 2.88 1.51 
Min -2.08 -1.29 -1.09 -0.43 -0.70 -4.76 -0.92 -3.64 
Source: Datastream  
*EMU4 (Germany, France, Italy, Spain) is weighed with GDP 
Even if the US experienced higher growth on average (the average growth rate of the 
US over the period was 2.9% and in  EMU4 it was 2.1%), from the table it emerges clearly 
that the US had a more expansionary stance. More importantly, as with monetary policy, 
the United States showed significantly higher fiscal activism over the period than EMU4 
(an interesting exception being Germany). The higher reactivity of American fiscal 
authorities is not surprising considering that the US have a lower level of social protection 
and of automatic stabilization, which calls for a more active role of macroeconomic policies 
_______________________ 
 
3 The fiscal impulse is computed as the negative of year-on-year changes in cyclically adjusted government net 
lending. It measures the discretionary fiscal stance of the country, a positive number denoting an expansionary 
period. 
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to limit the effects of harmful fluctuations of income (Creel and Saraceno, 2010). But there 
is more than that. Even if the European fiscal rules (the SGP and now the Fiscal Compact) 
never led to actual sanctions in spite of the numerous infringements, their very existence 
was capable of constraining governments’ action through peer pressure and a general 
reprobation attached to fiscal (and monetary) activism (Fitoussi and Saraceno, 2008). 
To summarize, the BBF Consensus is built around the hypothesis of market efficiency 
and has been enshrined in European institutions since the Maastricht Treaty. Discretionary 
policies are limited to a bare minimum, while rules and government by technocrats are 
preferred to remove the obstacles to the Pareto optimal equilibrium of the economy. EU 
institutions and practices resulted in inertial macroeconomic policies in Europe, even before 
the crisis hit in 2007. 
It is much harder to accept government by technocrats or by rules, however, if one 
believes, in the Keynesian tradition, that economic processes are inevitably characterized 
by failures and imperfections, whether of markets or of policy makers. If the platonic idea 
of a superior Walrasian equilibrium is abandoned, we are forced to accept the existence of a 
plurality of possible trajectories for the economy, resulting from the interaction of markets, 
institutions and public policies. This multiplicity of equilibrium paths, not necessarily 
ranked in terms of welfare, forces policy makers to choose a particular trajectory and 
therefore, among other things, one of the many possible distributions of resources between 
the different actors involved in the economic process. 
The crisis that began in 2007 confronted policy makers with hard choices. European 
institutions, and in particular the ECB, were not suited to the task. They had been designed 
at a time of “Great Moderation”, when it was believed that policy would at worst have to 
smooth the business cycle. The next section shows how this created tensions and 
inefficiencies in the management of the crisis that go a long way towards explaining the 
persistent weakness of the European economy seven years into the crisis. 
4. ECB action during the crisis 
The reaction of central banks to the near-collapse of interbank markets in 2007-2008 
was bold, coordinated, and overall successful. Central banks flooded markets with liquidity, 
and eased credit conditions; this happened through conventional and non-conventional 
interventions, and with different macroeconomic effects. While the Fed proceeded with 
both aggressive rate cuts (3.75 points from August 2007 to October 2008) and injections of 
liquidity, the ECB privileged the latter measures, and started cutting rates only in October 
2008, (after an increase in July 2008, weeks before the Lehman Brothers collapse). The two 
strategies were equally successful in terms of providing liquidity to the interbank markets 
and to combat the tendency of short-run rates to increase. However, they had different 
effects on long-term rates (European rates remained substantially higher than their US 
equivalent), and hence on the macroeconomic environment. Central banks also put in place 
non-conventional interventions, with the specific objective of ensuring sufficient liquidity 
in the interbank market, and de facto substituting commercial banks in that market. Open 
market operations were reinforced, notably by expanding the range of assets demanded as 
collateral, and including assets whose market value was difficult to determine. Furthermore, 
central banks increased their exposure, by engaging in longer term loans to the banking 
sector. 
As successful as it had been in avoiding a financial meltdown in the early stages of the 
crisis, monetary policy was not able to restore confidence. The massive injections of 
liquidity into the system were hoarded or invested in safe public bonds by banks in an 
attempt (vain, given the sharp reduction in stock market prices) to restore more sensible 
prudential ratios. The liquidity trap came out of the pages of the economic history books, 
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and confidently installed itself in the American and European economies. Monetary policy 
ran out of steam, at least as the main tool of policy intervention. 
Consistent with standard textbook prescriptions, centre stage was taken by fiscal 
policy, and in the winter of 2009 most advanced and emerging economies adopted and 
implemented fiscal stimulus plans. While these were probably not large enough to lift the 
economy out of the crisis, their impact was felt and the freefall was stopped. During 2009 
the ECB, like other central banks, maintained an accommodating stance, but remained in 
the background. 
The ECB’s low profile was bound not to last, however, because with the explosion of 
the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, monetary policy returned to the forefront. Consistent 
with the BBF Consensus, the crisis of Eurozone peripheral countries was interpreted by 
European governments and institutions as a fiscal morality tale (see, for example, Sinn, 
2014). In exchange for financial assistance from the EU and the IMF, countries in distress 
had to implement draconian structural reforms and austerity plans monitored by a Troika 
composed of the ECB, the European Commission and the IMF. Austerity was not limited to 
the periphery, however, as core countries joined in the fiscal consolidation effort that was 
seen to be the recipe for growth. In spite of the good health of its public finances, Germany 
engaged in a (so far successful) effort to balance its budget by 2015. Austerity and 
structural reforms have plunged the Eurozone into a double-dip recession, followed by a 
weak, mostly export-led recovery in 2013 and a new slide towards deflation in 2014. 
Disappointing growth and turmoil in sovereign debt markets put enormous strain on 
the Eurozone, threatening the very survival of the single currency. The incapacity of 
European governments to work together in a bold and coordinated response to both 
speculation and faltering growth forced the ECB to rush in to avert disaster. Interestingly 
enough, the path followed by the US was not very different. The political gridlock in the 
US forced President Obama to reverse the fiscal stance faster than he should have done, and 
the Fed had to step in with its quantitative easing programme to provide support to the 
economy. But the similarities stop there. First, the United States has a federal structure, so 
that transfers between states, such as unemployment benefits and tax receipts, contribute to 
rebalancing asymmetric business cycles. Second, the US stimulus had been significantly 
larger than the one implemented by EU countries. Furthermore, while the ECB was and still 
is constrained by the no bail-out clause that prevents it from directly purchasing sovereign 
bonds in the primary market, the Fed has no such limitation. This means that while the Fed 
could act as a buyer of last resort and buy government debt, thus making default virtually 
impossible (and keeping yields very low as a consequence), the ECB could not perform this 
important role of insurer. Eurozone countries in trouble, therefore, also had and have to fear 
speculation on their debt. 
Since 2010, ECB action has been marked by three major interventions, all of them 
made necessary by exceptional circumstances. The first is the Long-Term Refinancing 
Operations (LTRO) programme, launched in late 2011. Then, in 2012, the famous 
“whatever it takes” speech by Mario Draghi in London (July 26), followed in September by 
the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) programme. Finally, more recently, Mario 
Draghi's (2014) Jackson Hole speech, followed by the EMU version of quantitative easing. 
The first remarkable ECB intervention was the LTRO programme, launched in two 
instalments in late 2011 and in February 2012. The plan, prepared by Jean-Claude Trichet, 
but implemented on the watch of the new President Mario Draghi, was designed to respond 
to the persistent weakness of the Eurozone interbank market. The ECB provides liquidity to 
banks through its main refinancing operations, whose maturities in normal times rarely 
exceeded 30 days. With the crisis, long-term operations acquired importance. Loan duration 
was gradually increased until December 2011, when the ECB launched a large 36 month 
lending programme (amounting to a thousand billion euros) at a 1% rate. Most of the 
allotted funds were borrowed by financial institutions, and the ECB balance sheet inflated 
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accordingly (see Figure ). The quality of the balance sheet was questioned in many quarters 
(see the discussion in Wyplosz, 2012), in that the ECB further extended the range of 
collateral to be posted to the ECB. In particular, the ECB waived the credit rating 
requirement for Greek, Portuguese and Irish sovereign debt. In accepting to "pollute" the 
banks' balance sheet with toxic assets, the new President Mario Draghi marked a difference 
with his predecessor in that he recognized that a central bank’s role is to ensure stability of 
the financial system as much as it is to guarantee price stability. 
 The programme was successful, especially with the Eurozone peripheral banks in 
Ireland, Italy, Spain and Greece which obtained the lion's share of the funding. But it did 
not manage to end the credit crunch and to restart growth. A large portion of the financing 
provided to Eurozone banks through the LTRO was used to buy periphery sovereign debt. 
The LTRO therefore had the unintended consequence of further strengthening the vicious 
circle of banks and sovereign debt: large holdings of sovereign debt exposed banks to the 
risk of default; this led to increased fragility and put a strain on the public finances, thus 
increasing the risk of default and closing the vicious circle
4
. 
As Figure 5 shows, the LTRO programme did not succeed in calming the turmoil in 
the market for sovereign debt. During the summer of 2012, Italian and Spanish yields came 
under increasing strain, and discussion about a possible default and exit from the single 
currency started to spread, even if rejected by public officials. 
In a defining moment of his tenure as President of the ECB, Mario Draghi delivered a 
speech in London in which he famously said "But there is another message I want to tell 
you.  Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. 
And believe me, it will be enough." (Draghi, 2012). This bold statement, which calmed the 
markets overnight, was taken as a commitment for the ECB to step into the market for 
sovereign bonds and, if necessary, to stretch its mandate
5
 by acting as a lender/buyer of last 
resort for countries in trouble. This interpretation proved correct when, in September 2012, 
the ECB Governing Council almost unanimously approved the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) programme. 
Under the OMT programme the ECB commits to buy unlimited amounts of sovereign 
bonds of countries in trouble that request assistance, thus de facto transforming itself into a 
lender of last resort. In exchange for ECB protection, countries need to engage in a 
programme of fiscal austerity and structural reforms to be monitored by the Troika, similar 
to those required of countries that required financial assistance from the EU. In other 
words, with the OMT programme the ECB offered insurance in exchange for reforms and 
austerity. It was a deal that would entail the loss of a good deal of sovereignty. It is not by 
chance that Spain has always refused to apply for the programme in spite of heavy pressure, 
and so far no country has ever used it. Yet, the programme marked a turning point in the 
European crisis. While the BBF Consensus macroeconomic framework remained 
unchanged (and it was actually reinforced by the emphasis on conditionality), the mere 
possibility of accessing ECB protection through the OMT programme shielded the 
peripheral countries from speculative attacks. A look at Figure 5 shows that since late 2012 
spreads with German Bunds constantly decreased, and are today at perfectly sustainable 
levels.  
_______________________ 
 
4 The Eurozone banking union, that is taking shape at this moment, was meant to provide a supranational 
backstop for financial institutions, and a common supervisory board. The banking union being implemented 
falls short, especially on the first account (for details see Ubide, 2013). 
5 In fact, Mario Draghi forcefully denied that the ECB was stepping out of its mandate, arguing that a collapse 
of the euro, and the ensuing turmoil in financial markets would have undermined the very price stability that the 
ECB is meant to pursue. 
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Interestingly, at the time, the OMT programme was wrongly interpreted in some 
quarters as a clumsy attempt to implement quantitative easing in the Eurozone. In fact, it 
was clear from the beginning that, as with any insurance scheme, its success would be 
measured precisely by the fact that the ECB would not have to intervene in bond markets 
(Saraceno, 2012). As Figure  shows, as spreads started closing, financial institutions started 
paying back LTRO debt, and the ECB balance sheet shrank (its size is today at July 2011 
levels, just before the LTRO was launched). 
The LTRO and the OMT concurred to calm down financial markets in a durable way. 
Since the Autumn of 2012, the frequent turbulence (political and economic) that hit the 
Eurozone never triggered the type of financial turmoil experienced between 2009 and 2012.  
In this sense, the ECB’s policies, implemented in a context of inertial (when not 
countercyclical) fiscal policy, were successful. The two programmes did not succeed, 
however, in restarting growth in the Eurozone. The stabilization of financial markets led the 
ECB to slowly shift its focus from financial stability to macroeconomic performance. 
2014, the Annus Horribilis,  prompted another major shift of perspective for the ECB 
and for its President that triggered conflicts inside and outside the ECB
6
. In June, facing 
deteriorating expectations about future inflation, the ECB Governing Council abandons its 
caution, and explicitly admitted that the Eurozone inflation rate was too close to zero. This 
opened the way for a new round of liquidity injections, aimed at bringing the balance sheet 
back to 2012 levels (see Figure ). The programme started in September 2014 with the 
purchase of Covered Bonds and then Asset Backed Securities
7
. The results of this 
“European Quantitative Easing” programme, still unfolding at the time of writing (January 
2015), are mixed (Jones, 2014). While in some regions of the periphery, credit constraints 
on firms and households are still biting, in the Eurozone as a whole the persistent weakness 
of aggregate demand has an impact on demand for credit, and the large amount of liquidity 
available is not being used by financial institutions which are having a hard time finding 
borrowers. The impact of the programme on the economy is likely to be disappointing, and 
in January 2015 the ECB made a further major step forward, announcing the purchase of 
sovereign bonds outside the OMT programme to bring the size of its balance sheet roughly 
to the 2012 level. This further deepened the divide between hawks and doves within the 
Governing Council (Davies, 2014). Even if apparently sovereign risk mostly remains in the 
hands of national central banks, the programme is an important step forward, as it breaks 
the taboo on direct central bank intervening in sovereign bond markets. There are reasons to 
believe that the sovereign bond purchase will have mixed results, rather like the private 
bonds purchase launched in the Autumn of 2014. It is, in fact, evident that the economy 
never really lifted itself out of the liquidity trap. The troubles in the financial sector hid the 
increasingly depressed state of household and corporate expectations, which had an impact 
on the willingness to spend and to borrow. As constraints on credit supply are slowly lifted, 
financial institutions and the ECB find themselves facing insufficient credit demand. 
Furthermore, and potentially even more disturbing, the renewed activism of the ECB 
does not seem to stem from a change of thinking. The speech Draghi delivered at the 
Jackson Hole Central Bankers Symposium in August 2014 (Draghi, 2014a) has shaped a 
new consensus among European policy makers, based on three propositions: 
_______________________ 
 
6 To carry out the policy changes he had in mind, Mario Draghi had to twist some arms in the ECB Governing 
Council. This resulted in  unprecedented tensions  (see Reuters, 2014). In the meantime, a judgment on the 
constitutionality of the OMT programme is pending in the European Court of Justice at the request of the 
German Constitutional Court. In January 2015, a preliminary ruling gave comfort to Mario Draghi, declaring 
the OMT legal "in principle". The final ruling is expected in the late Spring 2015. 
7 An asset-backed security (ABS) is a corporate security (usually issued by a financial institution)  whose value 
is derived from and collateralized (or "backed") by a specified pool of underlying assets that typically are too 
illiquid to be sold separately. 
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1. Europe suffers from deficient aggregate demand. The impact of austerity on the 
economy had been underestimated (on this the ECB is cautious, while the IMF is much 
more explicit: see IEO, 2014), and the ongoing stagnation has depressed private 
spending as well. 
2. Monetary policy has lost traction, and while it needs to remain accommodating, it will 
not by itself be able to lift the economy out of the crisis. 
3. Finally, the length of the crisis has imposed a toll on the productive capacity of the 
economy,  its potential growth rate, and its capacity to grow in the long run. Therefore, 
investment is central to stimulating the economy in the short run and to sustaining 
potential growth in the medium term. 
The third point is particularly important, because the ECB President for the first time 
explicitly mentioned that fiscal policy should be used, within the limits set by the treaties, 
to support aggregate demand. What is interesting, however, is that while the diagnosis has 
changed, the policy prescriptions have not. The old narrative argued that the crisis was due 
to fiscal profligacy and insufficient flexibility in the economy. From the diagnosis followed 
the treatment: austerity and structural reforms to restore confidence, competitiveness, and 
private spending. Today we have a different diagnosis: the economy is in a liquidity trap, 
and spending stagnates because of insufficient expected demand. Yet, the recipe remains 
the same: 
“Let me add however that the success of our measures critically depends on a number 
of factors outside of the realm of monetary policy. Courageous structural reforms and 
improvements in the competitiveness of the corporate sector are key to improving business 
environment. This would foster the urgently needed investment and create greater demand 
for credit. Structural reforms thus crucially complement the ECB’s accommodative 
monetary policy stance and further empower the effective transmission of monetary policy. 
As I have indicated now at several occasions, no monetary – and also no fiscal – stimulus 
can ever have a meaningful effect without such structural reforms. The crisis will only be 
over when full confidence returns in the real economy and in particular in the capacity and 
willingness of firms to take risks, to invest, and to create jobs. This depends on a variety of 
factors, including our monetary policy but also, and even most importantly, the 
implementation of structural reforms, upholding the credibility of the fiscal framework, and 
the strengthening of euro area governance.” (Draghi, 2014b) 
To sum up, The Jackson Hole speech was only half a revolution. The focus remains on 
structural reforms, and only a limited role is envisaged for monetary and fiscal policy. The 
ECB is undoubtedly playing a leading role in the crisis, and it has been successfully steered 
by its President into uncharted waters (sometimes stretching its mandate). There are reasons 
for this, as it had to fill the void created by austerity and by the disappointing results of 
structural reforms. But it did so reluctantly, only to avert disaster and the implosion of the 
Eurozone; most importantly, it never challenged its adherence to the BBF Consensus.  At a 
recent speech in Helsinki  Mario Draghi (2014c) outlined his vision for the future of Europe 
calling for a closer Economic Union to complement the single currency by deciding and 
implementing coordinated reforms and fiscal discipline. Governments would in other words 
have to transfer sovereignty to the European level in order to better implement the BBF 
Consensus prescriptions. The problem is that it is hard to believe that more of the same, 
even if better coordinated and implemented, would yield the success that has eluded the 
Eurozone so far. The next section explores possible alternative scenarios. 
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5. Towards effective macroeconomic governance: The ECB 
mandate and a modified golden rule for the Eurozone 
Faced with mounting deflationary pressures, European policy makers rely on the “QE 
European Edition” that the ECB is putting in place. While necessary and welcome, as 
observed above, such loosening may not allow the Eurozone to embark on a robust growth 
path. We know since Keynes, (1936) that in a liquidity trap monetary policy loses traction. 
Today, a depressed economy, stagnant income, high unemployment, uncertainty about the 
future, all help to compress private spending and demand for credit across the Eurozone, 
while they increase the appetite for liquidity. At the end of 2013, private spending on 
consumption and investment was 7% lower than in 2008 (a figure that reached a staggering 
18% for peripheral countries). Granted, radical ECB moves, like announcing a higher 
inflation target, could have an impact on expectations and trigger increased spending; but 
these are not politically feasible. It is not improbable, therefore, that a “simple” quantitative 
easing programme may amount to pushing on a string. The ECB had already accomplished 
half a miracle, stretching its mandate to become de facto a lender of last resort, and 
defusing speculation. It cannot be asked to do much more than this. 
But what to do in a liquidity trap? Luckily, Keynes comes to the rescue. In the 
General Theory he argues that whenever monetary policy loses traction, the stage should be 
taken by fiscal policy, as developed and emerging economies successfully did in 2009. 
Eurozone economies should stop relying on the ECB and embark on a global fiscal 
expansion, finally reversing the pro-cyclical fiscal stance that has dominated since 2010. 
This fiscal expansion should be centred around the increased investment that resurfaced in 
the debate on European economic policy, so as to become the cornerstone of the 
programme presented by new Commission President Juncker. 
Public investment deficiency is now chronic. Less visible and politically sensitive than 
current expenditure, for twenty years it has been the adjustment variable for European 
governments seeking to meet the Maastricht criteria and to control their deficits (Figure 
6). Since the crisis hit, private investment has also collapsed, and is still held well below its 
long-term trend by depressed demand and negative expectations (including in the Eurozone 
core; see DIW, 2013). 
In this context the Juncker plan (European Commission, 2014) is welcome news even 
if, as is too often the case in Europe, it is too little and too late. The plan foresees the 
creation of a European Fund for Strategic Investments endowed with €21bn from the 
European budget (€16bn, mostly reallocation of existing funds)  and from the European 
Investment Bank (€5bn). This is meant to lever conspicuous private funds (in a ratio of 15 
to 1) to attain the objective of €315bn, mobilized over three years. EU countries may 
contribute to the Fund, but the contribution is not compulsory. As the allocation of funds 
will not be proportional to the contribution to the fund, there is a chance that governments 
will not rush to contribute. 
Two aspects of the plan raise issues. First, the size: the predicted ratio of private to 
public spending necessary to reach the 315 billion is 15 to 1. This is enormous, as typical 
public-private partnerships rarely attain a ratio of 3 to 1. But even in the far from realistic 
assumption that the plan could create a positive dynamic and mobilize private resources to 
the announced 315 billion, this amounts to just over 2% of GDP for the three years 2015-
2017 (approximately 0.7% annually). The plan is too little, far too little, to put the continent 
back on track. The second, and even more problematic, issue is the contingent nature of the 
plan. Its size and time horizon, as well as the lack of involvement of national governments, 
seem ill suited to reversing the unsatisfactory trend of the last three decades and to bring 
about long-term investment levels compatible with structurally higher growth. To sum up, 
the Juncker plan suffers from the lack of a real expenditure capacity at the Union level, and 
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it is therefore forced to build a complex architecture that will either fall short of the target it 
has set, or become dangerously over-leveraged.  
In an ideal world, the crisis and deflation would be dealt with by means of a vast 
European investment programme, financed by the European budget and through 
Eurobonds. Infrastructure projects, green growth and the digital economy are just some of 
the areas for which the optimal scale of investment is European, and for which a 
coordinated long-term plan would be necessary. A “Marshall Plan 2.0”, in other words, 
capable of giving the economy the stimulus that has been missing in the past seven years 
(Chowdhury and Islam, 2014). The increasing mistrust among European countries 
exhausted by the crisis, together with the fierce opposition of Germany and other northern 
countries to any suggestion of debt mutualisation, make this strategy virtually impossible. 
The solution must therefore be found at national level, without giving up European-
wide coordination, which would guarantee effective and fiscally sustainable investment 
programmes.  Derviş and Saraceno (2014) recently proposed that the EMU should adopt a 
fiscal rule similar to the one implemented in the UK by Chancellor of the Exchequer 
Gordon Brown in the 1990s, and applied until 2009
8
. The new rule would require countries 
to balance their current budget, while financing public capital accumulation with 
debt. Investment expenditure, in other words, would be excluded from deficit calculation, a 
principle that also emerges, timidly, in the Juncker plan. Such a rule would stabilize the 
ratio of debt to GDP, it would focus efforts of public consolidation on less productive items 
of public spending, and would ensure inter-generational equity (future generations would 
be called to partially finance the stock of public capital bequeathed to them). Last, but not 
least, especially in the current situation, putting in place such a rule would not require treaty 
changes. 
The golden rule is not a new idea, and in the past it has been criticized on the ground 
that it introduces a bias in favour of physical capital and penalizes certain expenditure on 
areas such as education and healthcare that, while classified as current, are crucial for future 
growth. This criticism, however, can be turned around and transformed into a strength.  
Derviş and Saraceno propose that at regular intervals, for example every seven years, in 
connection with the European budget negotiation, the Commission, the Council and the 
Parliament reach agreement on the future priorities of the Union, and make a list of areas or 
expenditure items exempted from deficit calculation for the subsequent years. Joint 
programmes between neighbouring countries could be encouraged by providing co-
financing by the European Investment Bank. The modified golden rule would in fact yield a 
return, on a European scale, to industrial policy, a political and democratic determination of 
the EU’s long-term growth objectives. The entrepreneurial State, through public 
investment, could once again become the centre piece of a large-scale European industrial 
policy, capable of implementing physical as well as intangible investment. Pending a real 
federal budget, the bulk of investments would remain the responsibility of national 
governments, in deference to the principle of subsidiarity. But the modified golden rule 
would coordinate and guide them towards the development and well-being of the Union as 
a whole. 
However, the reform of EMU macroeconomic governance should not be confined to 
fiscal policy. As indicated above,  the EMU institutional setup led to excessive inertia by 
the ECB before and during the crisis (Table 1). It was also discussed at length how the ECB 
had to stretch its mandate and adopt cumbersome communication strategies (see footnote 5) 
to reconcile its activism with the strict price stability objective it was supposed to pursue. 
_______________________ 
 
8 For more information see the references in Creel et al., (2009) and, for a critical view, Balassone and Franco, 
(2000). 
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The dual mandate of the Fed in the US, on the other hand, allowed a much more effective 
and transparent action, suited to the exceptional period we are experiencing. The crisis 
further showed that at times of economic distress, anchoring the private sector’s 
expectations is vastly insufficient to restore growth and employment. 
In fact, the case for strict inflation targeting appears weak once it is admitted, contrary 
to the tenets of the BBF Consensus, that monetary policy may have an impact on economic 
activity, which requires policy makers to arbitrate between sometimes conflicting 
objectives. Furthermore, the inflation mandate has had an impact on ECB action, regarding 
both its reactivity (in particular during the crisis) and the transparency of its communication 
strategy, a crucial element of central banking effectiveness. However, there are at least two 
other arguments that can be made in favour of adopting a Fed-like dual mandate. 
The first is a simple assignment problem. Following Mundell, (1961), the task of 
monetary authorities should be to react to common shocks. The optimal monetary policy 
response to idiosyncratic shocks is to "do nothing" (Lane, 2000), leaving the task to 
national fiscal policies that remain decentralised. The strict inflation target, and the absence 
of a federal government capable of implementing EMU-wide fiscal policies, leaves one of 
the objectives of macroeconomic policy, the reaction to common shocks, without an 
instrument. Either fiscal policy (through a real European budget) or monetary policy 
(through a dual mandate) should be assigned to that objective. Standard textbook analysis 
actually suggests that a combination of the two would be the most effective. 
The second argument is not confined to monetary unions. As the debate between 
hawks and doves shows in the US, a dual mandate does not necessarily mean insufficient 
attention to price stability. The dual mandate was in place when Chairman Paul Volcker 
conducted a bold anti-inflationary monetary policy in the early 1980s. And just three years 
ago, in the midst of the financial crisis, Chicago Fed President Charles Evans complained 
that too much attention was being paid to inflation and public deficits, and concluded that 
“if 5% inflation would have our hair on fire, so should 9% unemployment.” (Evans, 2011). 
In other words, nothing prevents central banks from fighting inflation in the framework of a 
dual mandate; but they cannot fight unemployment within inflation targeting. One 
institutional arrangement may encompass the other through the appropriate choice of 
weights, but the converse is not true. Once again, the fundamental justification of exclusive 
focus on price stability can only lie in the acceptance of a neoclassical platonic world in 
which macroeconomic policy is ineffective, and hence governments need to make no 
choice. 
The crisis has highlighted another deficiency of the BBF consensus, namely its neglect 
of financial stability as an objective of monetary policy. This neglect is based on 
conventional wisdom, first explicitly stated by Schwartz (1995), that a monetary regime 
that produces aggregate price stability will, as a by-product, tend to promote stability of the 
financial system (Borio and Lowe, 2002, p. 27). Price instability would lead to uncertainty, 
shortened investment horizons, changes in the value of collateral. All of this would 
encourage speculation and favour financial instability. The consequences for policy are 
therefore straightforward. Following, for example, Bernanke and Gertler (2001),  central 
banks have been neglecting to set targets for asset prices unless these threatened price 
stability. The conventional wisdom had already been questioned before the crisis. 
Leijonhufvud (2007) argues, for example, that price stability could lead, via low interest 
rates, to excessive risk taking and a higher probability of financial crises. The crisis itself, 
coming after two decades of subdued inflation, challenged the conventional view. This has 
only led, so far, to marginal changes in the policy prescription. The benchmark model 
adopted by the banking profession has been amended in order to introduce financial 
stability, but that is nevertheless assumed to be positively correlated with price stability 
(Woodford, 2012). Thus, monetary policy should at best only adopt a flexible inflation 
target, or simply better coordinate with the bodies in charge of financial regulation and 
supervision (Blanchard et al., 2010). Yet, the assumption of a positive correlation between 
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inflation and asset prices seems empirically unwarranted (Blot et al., 2015; Cukierman, 
2013). 
With the banking union, the ECB is given a supervisory role that formalizes its 
involvement in the management of the Eurozone financial sector. Furthermore, as has been 
discussed at length, the Central Bank has been active well beyond the inflation targeting 
mandate that the Treaties assign to the institution in Frankfurt. It is clear that today it is 
exploring uncharted waters, and making choices that involve trade-offs.  ECB Vice-
President Vítor Constâncio implicitly acknowledged the widened scope for central bank 
action in a recent speech on the prospects for the banking union (Constâncio, 2014), while 
arguing that financial stability should not be a concern for ECB action. More interestingly, 
the ECB Vice-President acknowledged the trade-off faced by the ECB between low 
inflation and the risks of asset price inflation brought about by central bank activism.  
The time has therefore come to rethink the ECB mandate, and to adapt it to the tasks 
that it already pursues de facto. Blot et al., (2014) argue that the treaties should be amended 
to account explicitly for the triple task of financial stability, macroeconomic stability and, 
of course, price stability. This would avoid schizophrenic communication, enhance 
transparency and democratic control over ECB action, and deliver more effective monetary 
policy, especially at times of crisis. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper has highlighted how EMU governance as designed by the Maastricht 
Treaty and subsequent modifications, is unfit to deliver sound and effective macroeconomic 
management. This is especially evident at times of crisis. The paper has argued that: 
1. Monetary and fiscal policy in the EMU design leave very little room for manoeuvre 
consistent with the prescriptions of the BBF Consensus that focus mainly on the 
supply side of the economy 
2. The dominant narrative on the EMU crisis, consistent with the BBF Consensus, 
blames the crisis on the fiscal profligacy of peripheral countries. This has led to 
procyclical fiscal policies 
3. The inertial or procyclical behaviour of fiscal authorities, projected a reluctant ECB to 
the front of the scene. Without decisive (and controversial) ECB action, the Eurozone 
would probably not exist today. 
4. Yet, the ECB, and European policy makers at large, still adhere to the BBF Consensus. 
The consequence is that the crisis keeps being one step ahead of the  policy response, 
that is, always too little and too late. 
5. The conclusion is that without reform of the Eurozone’s macroeconomic governance, 
it is difficult to foresee a permanent resolution of current woes. The paper suggests 
adopting a modified golden rule of public finances, and considering the introduction of 
a dual (or even triple) mandate for the ECB 
Eurozone governance reform unfortunately did not challenge the BBF Consensus. On 
the contrary, the fiscal compact, the evolving banking union project, the Juncker plan, all 
combine to strengthen the idea that coordination and burden sharing, as well as active 
macroeconomic management as can be observed in large countries like the United States, 
Japan or even China, remains a chimera for the European Union, and in particular for the 
Eurozone. 
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Annex – Figures 
Figure 1: Real GDP – 2008=100 
 
Source: European Commission AMECO Database. 
Shaded area is forecast 
 
Figure 2: Yearly Inflation Rates 
 
Source: Datastream 
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Figure 3: Unemployment According to ILO Definition 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Figure 4: Lost Decades: GDP in Japan and the EMU 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
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Figure 5: ECB Balance Sheet - Assets 
 
Source: ECB - Fred 
 
Figure 6 : Ten Year Government Bond Yields – Spreads with Germany 
 
Source: Datastream 
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Figure 7: Public Investment as a Percentage of Total Public Expenditure (Excluding Interest) 
 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook 
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